| נשלח ב-11/9/2005 17:50 |
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Halakha Mi'Sinai Hirsch/Frankel
Thanks for the opportunity to write here.
There were a few discussions on this topic in the hebrew Atzor, but they weren't conclusive enough.
Without going into superfluous intricacies, I will present a point concerning that issue.
R' Samson Raphael Hirsch maintained that "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" goes back literally to Moses, according to its simplistic translation.
R' Zacharia Frankel argued that there was a historical development in the "oral law", and that "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" was the title for edicts issued by the rabbis in the time of the Talmud according to the then prevailing conditions in Jewish life. These enactments were named after Moses in order to emphasize that the laws were in accordance with the Mosaic spirit that originated from Sinai and also to grant those laws the Mosaic prestige, weight and authority.
R' Hirsch declared R' Frankel as a heretic etc... Hermann Cohen, then a young student, wrote a private letter to R' Hirsch defending his teacher, R' Frankel by stressing how the latter was a strictly observant Jew who conducted himself in all respects in a strict rabbinical manner. R' Hirsch printed Cohen's letter (in "Jeschurun" 1861 p. 297) adding a public answer saying that one cannot draw conclusions from R' Frankel's personal life and conduct, if he expresses himself differently in his writings; and the latter proves more of his inner beliefs than the former.
R' Abraham ben Mordekhai Halevi (Ginat Vradim, Orah hayim kelal 2, no. 6) who was an accepted 'gadol' in the seventeenth century, states that once the halakha has been decided, we treat our Torah text thereof as if (keilu) it is from Sinai, even though in reality it is the product of our scholars' decision.
In a controversy that happened a few years ago, it was stated by a recognized 'gadol' of our period, that as long as people keep all halachot ('kala kevachamura'), there should be no concern about their speculative thoughts.
In light of these two arguments, we may conclude that a terrible wrong has been done to R' Frankel and consequently to the whole of the traditional Judaism.
This leaves us to the conclusion, that to belong to the Torah fold, has a pure political meaning not necessarily in agreement with the Torah itself.
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| נשלח ב-12/9/2005 04:47 |
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שכליאל -
You have raised two issues:
1] The theological debate about what is ; "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" , whether it's literally given by Moshe or ,as you put it : "These enactments were named after Moses in order to emphasize that the laws were in accordance with the Mosaic spirit that originated from Sinai and also to grant those laws the Mosaic prestige, weight and authority" .
2] The sociological question , what should be the "verdict" for those who don't follow the order.
I'll be constraining on the first issue. there is slightly a contradiction in your words. According to what you have said the sages at one point decided to strengthen their edicts by telling that it was given from Sinai . why did they thought that this is what missing in order to introduce the Halakha to the people , unless they all ready knew that people will not accept rules if they aren't originate from Sinai.
That tells us that people accepted only what they thought was from Sinai. so any way you will refer to this matter you'll find out that "H. L .M" was deeply "soaked" into the Jewish people tradition, and had probably ancient roots.
What's seems to me the story of "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" was ; that all the traditions formulas that had no particular reason where called "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" by the assumption that everything comes from there.
A good book that gives quit a good picture about this issue ; השתלשלות ההלכה by professor Gilat
he shows how the Halakha turned from strict tradition to what was at list those times reasonable formulation of laws and edicts.
hopefully I'll comment on the second matter later.
תוקן על ידי - עצור_כאן - 12/09/2005 18:05:59
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| נשלח ב-12/9/2005 18:23 |
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Hello Cosmos
Your theory makes sense. I didn't write that the sages decided at a "certain point". "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" was probably the ultimate answer to anyone asking too many questions. It is a parallel to naming apikoires anyone that does not or even cannot accept something that is widely accepted by the Torah Jewry.
Furthermore, I didn't mean to go into the speculative domain of trying to guess how exactly the "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" credo has been applied. Historically, I do not think that R' S.R. Hirsch would say that he has anyway to know what happened at Sinai. I don't think he was neither stupid nor corrupt.
I see the discussion between both sides (which I presented under Hirsch/Frankel) not about what actually happened, but about the meaning of the "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" rule. R' Hirsch saw it as an obligation to accept that it was said to Moses for if not one might loose membership of Torah Judasim and R' Frankel argued that it is not necessary. It is enough if we accept it as something strongly accepted in the Torah Jewry.
I saw a similar argument in Atzor between Chouteng and Veto concerning Rav Nadel's opinion over the biblical stories. Chouteng claimed that R.N. said that one has to accept that the stories actually happened and Veto claimed that R.N. meant that one has to accept that the stories have the same legitimacy as if they happened.
I think that until a certain age (I mean a level of intelligence), one should go by the Hirsch/Chouteng doctrine, but when one reaches a point when one cannot believe so without corrupting oneself, then one must go by the alternative doctrine.
At first it may seem a leniency to go by the latter doctrine. However, at a certain point (level of intelligence) it is just the opposite. Either deep down in the so called subconscious or by some even openly, the first doctrine will cause a denial of the Torah's validity. On the other hand recognizing that we have to accept it as if even if it didn't permits the serious adult to continue his eventual growth along his/her Judaic background.
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| נשלח ב-13/9/2005 03:33 |
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Thanks for opening this English version of Atzor.
I am an occasional writer in עצכ"ח
But since my ivrit is not that good I am not a full participant. My English is a bit better but not of academic quality so I hope you guys bare with me.
You write
>>>In a controversy that happened a few years ago, it was stated by a recognized 'gadol' of our period, that as long as people keep all halachot ('kala kevachamura'), there should be no concern about their speculative thoughts.<<<
This posisition is not supported by the Rishonim and is well articulated by the Ramban.
I will bring the quote in Hebrew:
רמבן דברים פר' כז, פסוק כו
אשר לא יקים את דברי התורה הזאת כאן כלל את כל התורה כולה, וקבלוה עליהם באלה ובשבועה, לשון רש"י ולפי דעתי, כי הקבלה הזאת שיודה במצות בלבו ויהיו בעיניו אמת ויאמין שהעושה אותן יהיה לו שכר וטובה והעובר עליהן יענש, ואם יכפור באחת מהן או תהיה בעיניו בטלה לעולם הנה הוא ארור אבל אם עבר על אחת מהן, כגון שאכל החזיר והשקץ לתאותו או שלא עשה סוכה ולולב לעצלה, איננו בחרם הזה כי לא אמר הכתוב אשר לא יעשה את דברי התורה הזאת, אלא אמר אשר לא יקים את דברי התורה הזאת לעשות, כטעם קיימו וקבלו היהודים והנה הוא חרם המורדים והכופרים:
Thus we see that 'observing' mitzvoth is not what makes you, or undoes you as a member in good standing of klal yisrael. Therefore, on the question if R. Frankel or even R. M. Mendleson observed mitzvoth or not is beside the point.
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| נשלח ב-13/9/2005 04:10 |
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שכליאל
I think that the historical question - weather thing actually occur or just invented by human, no matter how great and supreme they have been - is impotent and inherent to our faith.
Why so? the reason for it , in my eyes, is very simple; the all concept of our faith is based on that!
And the Lord said unto Moses, Thou shalt say unto the children of Israel, Ye have seen that I have talked with you from heaven . Based on that was given the most significant rule :
Ye shall not make with me gods of silver ,etc, and so on
That is the concept of H.L.M . I don't argue that one can not be perfect and moral with out the Torah , on the contrary, the world is packed with wonderful people who didn't even heard about Judaism. But if one want , for some reason ,to keep the Torah as it was given to Moshe he should at least accept that it is expected from him to believe in that fundamental belief.
That has nothing to do with "level of intelligence" that is just the root of all.
תוקן על ידי - cosmo_jew - 13/09/2005 4:14:43
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| נשלח ב-13/9/2005 12:02 |
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הטקסט שלך כאןConcerning the Ramban :- Note_ The Ramban says that - lo yakim- means one who denies the validity of a certain mitzvah. The Ramban contrasts that with the case of one who fails to be mekayyem a certain mitzvoh who is , of course, an avaryan but is not begeder lo yakim. So - the Ramban contrasts the case of one who fails to practice but believes with the case of one who denies, who lacks belief.
Nowhwere does the Ramban mention the case under discussion here- that of the one who PRACTICES BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE. So- it's not so poshut.
I have heard people point out that Chazal do not speak about belief bikhlal- even when they speak of inyonei kefiroh- they refer to these inyonim by saying- HoOmer- One who says-as in HoOmer ein techiyas hameisim min haTorah, HoOmer HaKodosh Borukh Hu Vatron hu etc. It seems that even when it comes to inyonei emunos vedeyos Chazal expressed the decisive factor in terms of what one says- that is - how one conducts oneself outwardly which makes an impression in the social world.
Perhaps one might say that inyonei emunos vedeyos that are in one's heart and remain there are begeder dvorim sheblev vekhu'. It is the outward manifestations that count. I am not saying that I know this to be true concerning the gishoh of Chazal; I don't. Aderabbah, bosi rak leorer.
Also, perhaps one might say there is something somewhat strange about the idea of a man keeping all the mitzvos of the Torah while being a kofer. If he does not believe, why does he keep the mitzvos?
One might say that if one keeps all the mitzvos that shows that he believes in the Torah and his thought out or stated denials are something like a weird psychological tic or a pathological obsession.
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| נשלח ב-13/9/2005 12:12 |
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BTW- I belive this was the gishah of Moses Mendelsohn who argued that the obligations of a believing Jew extended only to the realm of maaseh and not to the realm of deyos. Mendelssohn stated that one was free to hold whatever deyos appealed to him as long as he was mekayyem the mitzvos.According to MM, Yiddishkayt bound one in the realm of action but not in the realm of thought and belief?
Question- Who is the Godol who said we ought not to pay attention to the question of a person's deyos as long as he/she is mekayyem the mitzvos ?
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| נשלח ב-13/9/2005 12:23 |
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I would like to clarify something I said before. I understand that one might be mekayyem all the mitzvos HaTorah and yet be considered a kofer because he actively denies an idea that is considered meikrei hoemunoh. For instance, he might be kofer in bias haMoshiach. Therefore what R. Hirsch said about Z. Frankel is theoretically plausible. Z. F. was denying the true nature of the inyon of HL"M, which according to RSR Hirsch constituted kefirah.
What I meant was: One who is mekayyem kol mitzvos haTorah bekhol proteihem vedikdukeihem while claiming that he does not believe in Torah min Hashomayim bikhlal. In that case, I think there might be room to say that his actions ought to be seen as speaking louder than his words and his words can be seen as just an expression of some kind of mishugas vekhu'- Ubosi rak leorer.
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| נשלח ב-13/9/2005 14:34 |
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Hello Yohcee
I thank Sherira for having spared me the effort. (Ramban only differentiates between laziness and rebellion, but everything within "laasot".) It is a very old discussion (I think also in Atzor, see links in 163951) in which it is generally recognized that at the talmudic level it was determined by actions: "ochel nevelot" and only in the time of the rishonim in which Jewish Philosophy started, then opinions also became an issue.
Cosmo,
I certainly agree with you that this is the standard charedi way of thinking. However the Torah itself from the same source you brought, thinks differently. As you quoted, it says: "Ye have seen". Rashi brings down that "this is for you but not for those who have not seen". For them it can only be an issue of acceptance (see 142497). Furthermore, it would be the greatest "chilul Hashem" (whatever one means by Hashem) to assume that it is demanded to believe in something one has no way of knowing. This is why I am sure that any honest and intelligent person will never say "I saw", but only "I have good reason to believe".
Therefore there can only be an argument between the necessary way of believing. At a certain level one will claim that the necessity to believe is to put in one's head that it actually happened (R' Hirsch) and at another level one will realize that we need to accept to act "as if", without putting in one's head that it actually happened.
Even Etnachta who clearly holds by the first way, wrote lately in Atzor (1520728, page 2) that he believes in demons and angels, but would send anyone claiming to have seen them, in a mental asyleum.
On the other hand, even those who hold by the second way like myself, do not claim chas veshalom that it did not happen (not only for if so I would loose my belief, but also because we have no way to know so). They only claim that since there is no knowledge in the pure sense of the word, it is only an issue of acceptance which may be stronger than knowledge, depending of the depth of commitment. In other words; at the knowledge level, "no no" is enough. This means that as long as knowledge does not deny, one is free to accept/believe for the sake of one's growth or any other interest. Again, that acceptance, can occur either by putting the picture in one's mind directly (R' Hirsch) or by behaving as if the picture would have been put. Therefore the same person may at a certain level accept in the first way and at another level in the second way.
Returning to the subject of "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" not being an issue of fooling oneself but only an issue of acceptance (mamash or "as if"). This is not only concerning "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" and the stories of the Torah. It is a basic fundament of any transmitted system. Every judicial systems, has a basic unchangeable constitution. In religion one has basic absolutes that without them the whole system will crumble.
It was suggested in Atzor (592485) that this is the basic original difference between the written and oral Torah. The written was meant to be the absolute basic text in which any later change has to be anchored. Changes became much slower once the oral Torah was written, although human understanding has immensely changed at an even quicker pace than before. "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai" is merely an extension of that same legitimacy to some oral transmissions. Today it is extended to all strongly established customs. (For some reason Maimoni feels that one can still fight that extension without fighting the Talmudic extension of "Halakha le'Moshe Mi'Sinai".)
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| נשלח ב-15/9/2005 01:32 |
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Dear Sachliel, when you say "meant" what do you mean? Who told you that?
From the knowledge we have gathered until now days we know that although Judaism accepts some changes but they shouldn't harm the fundaments.
It's plausible to say that changes within the lines and Judaism restrictions are not "changes" but alterations. The minute the change stand against that concept, they become a problem . It is rather hard to define what change is actually an attempt to shake the Torah's foundations, and what is the contrary, a fence.
Beside this, we have to ask what the motivation behind the change desire is.
Does it represent a contestation under the rabbinical reign, which by it self is against Judaism, or not.
That doesn't necessarily mean that one should be obligated to anachronistic edicts or, of course, to the Rabbis. But shouldn't he clarify it? And distinguish him self from the rest of the orthodox society?
I'm trying to figure out exactly where we stand here.
תוקן על ידי - cosmo_jew - 15/09/2005 1:33:35
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| נשלח ב-15/9/2005 17:18 |
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Dear Cosmo
I understand that you referred to my following writing: "The written was meant
to be the absolute basic text in which any later change has to be anchored."
You ask one question and make one remark. The question is how do I (Sachliel) know it ("who told you?").
The remark is that Judaism (obviously referring to orthodoxy as standard Judaism) does not allow fundamental changes. Let me first clarify regarding the remark before responding to the question.
In my writting (quoted above) I did not elaborate as to the kind of changes I had in mind or whether they can or cannot, should or should not be made and whether they were acceptable to the orthodox or only to the progressive Jewry. This is a different subject on which there is not much to discuss about, for it is not a question of logic but of the force of the sociological gun. (Fortunately, the internet anonimity enables us to discuss these issues openly and that contributes to some evolution -not revolution- in Jewish thinking.) For the sake of our discussion here in this cluster up to this point, we may well deal only with such changes that you call alterations and such that are in fact accepted by orthodoxy (although mostly not admitted).
Now to the question as to how do I know that this is the original form of the Torah?
Well, I pointed to a cluster in the hebrew Atzor dealing with the issue, but I will try to mention what passes my memory at this moment.
1. The differentiation between a written and an oral Torah.
2. The prohibition to verbalize the written orally and to write the oral.
3. Almost no Mitzvah/Halachah is compatible with the written text.
4. As I mentioned earlier, any serious educational system works that way.
Again, the main reason the dynamism has stopped is that the oral Torah has turned holier than the written Torah. The written is taken seriously but not literally (by the oral one), while the oral one is taken literally.
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| נשלח ב-15/9/2005 18:56 |
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welcome to this gevaldige forum
on the inyan of h.l.m. the rambam in the hakdama to pirush hamishnayos says that it means any halacah which has no machlokes.
i heard a vort from the krasner rav z"l on the gemara that says: metamin hoyu hakohen hasoref hapara "lehotzie m'libon shel tzedokim"
that many times the heretics don't make their thoughts known and go along with the chachumim but inside they don't believe.
so they did these extreme things to annoy these tzedokim that they should bring their thoughts out in the open "lehotzie milibon" to make them talk.
תוקן על ידי - aaatozzz - 15/09/2005 19:00:03
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