| נשלח ב-22/12/2005 09:54 |
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Is philosophy an exercise in futilty? h
Orthoprax wrote an interesting post here http://orthoprax.blogspot.com/2005/12/absurdity-of-absurdities.html#comments
He writes the following;
Let me explain the biggest philosophical rut that I and the rest of the 21st century's forward thinking folks are stuck in. Most people, even highly intelligent and well-read ones, will ignore this issue, often, I suspect because it makes them uncomfortable as no great answers to it are forthcoming.
The problem is that we humans really have no sufficient basis for forming any lasting metaphysical philosophy because as we are living in a scientific age where any such philosophy must be based at least somewhat on the standard epistemological foundations. And yet as soon as we create one based on the scientific knowledge as we know it to be, a new fact is discovered which destroys this philosophy from the very beginning. There is too much change going on in modern times about our understanding of humanity and the universe for any philosophy made today to be long-lasting. Trying to make one is an effort in futility.
For example, it's silly to try and deduce functions of human psychology, which is popularly done in modern society, because few of those conclusions have evidential support. In order to truly be convincing people just want to see the scientific study and the data found. The conclusions from those fancy philosophical thoughts can easily be disproved based on experiments done by a graduate student at some community college. Perhaps that is a little exaggeration, but still there does not seem to be much value in thinking about the fundamental drives and reasons for human action without first considering input from guys like neurologists and psychologists.
And yet to live meaningfully in our short existences we must find a philosophy by which we can judge actions and goals and virtues in a way that does not seem forced or artificial. To do so we _must_ find our thinking going outside what is known and what perhaps what can be known. Perhaps we conceptualize things like gods, or geists, or the Good, but in any case we are escaping from scientific thinking and considering the irrational. And yet our rational, critical minds won't allow us to seriously consider such things.
We find that we must consider the irrational but at the same time we cannot consider the irrational. Absurdity of absurdities!
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| נשלח ב-22/12/2005 09:58 |
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My response;
I don't understand why the breakthroughs in science, past or future have much to say about philosophy.
Aristotle said some 2000 years ago that 'more than anything else man seeks happiness' would Aristotle necessarily disagree with himself today?
Has 'love' changed its meaning if we know which part of the cerebellum causes such?
Has quantum mechanics changed the truth about logic? Has 2+2 become 5?
Has the Question of Free Will changed any since some Greek philosophers have thrown a monkey wrench in it? (Did Hasdai Crescas of Ohr Hashem fame deny Free Will due to some scientific discovery? Or did R' Tzadok deny same due to the Copernican revolution?
Has the concept of God changed due to some scientific breakthrough? Ok, I'm talking about God in the Spinozian/Kabbalistic sense. God as Existence/Being (Haviah?)
As for an enduring philosophy, all I want is harmony within my self, where my wants, my expectations, are based on what the facts tell me is to be expected. Eliminate conflict where my picture of the future doesn't harmonize with my reality of the future by letting reality reign supreme, thus insuring ultimate happiness, Nirvana.
Eliminate conflict where I look at reality from two different angles, not ready to encompass all angles in one wholeness, so that the whole of reality (my reality that is, which incidentally is the only one I can possibly know) is taken into account. Accepting the whole reality as I see it and thus being led to taking the whole of existence into account when doing something, others as much as myself, for all angles (of reality) are created equal. Facts will be facts. And when I disregard part of reality I get, yes, a reality check. A little voice tells me hey this is not the whole picture and try as I might to disregard that facet of reality I just can't because if it's there it's there. Maybe I try to tell this voice that this particular facet of reality is insignificant, that it's a tiny part of the whole picture, but the voice asks me to prove my case and heck I can't. (helluva task trying to prove that this here thing is smaller than what it actually is, don't work for me.)
There always will be the little voice telling me to be more inclusive in my picture of reality, this voice is always right at my line of demarcation, the line where I have stopped looking, where I have stopped taking the 'other' side of that line into account. The further back on this 'other' side the smaller the voice becomes, I simply stop seeing so far away when I'm not focusing there, my conflict is always at the edge, right where I made this arbitrary line. My voice/mind doesn't understand this arbitrariness, it doesn't accept it, so one part of my mind still sees it while the other disregards it, a perfect recipe for conflict.
Yet even when I will slowly become more inclusive, pushing the line if you will, although there will temporary peace because this incessant voice will be pacified, there will be a new line and a new voice, not until I have eliminated this arbitrary line entirely will I be rid of any voices/awareness's contradicting other awareness's of mine.
I sometimes think of this conflict as if I'm looking at a move in a chess game where if I look at it by just thinking of the Rooks options I will see reality A, and if I look at it by just thinking of the Bishops option then I have Reality B. By looking one minute on reality A and the next minute on reality B I'm in conflict. But in true fact what I really have is a Rook AND a Bishop, Reality C. If I look at reality from Tom's vantage point and then I look at reality from Dick's angle I will be conflicted, but if my reality encompasses Tom's Dick's and Harry's reality then there's no conflict it's all in the whole picture. And the above is true regardless if MY name is Tom Dick or Harry.
Happiness and Peace in a nutshell, huh? I wish.
In all of the above cases I bow down to the Facts, to Existence. I humble myself before Existence/God and obediently listen to His every utterance. Yup, I love to use a metaphor (a Godly one at that) on this abstract called Existence it just hits home much stronger. Poetic license, hmm. Hey, I'm a poet and I didn't even know it.
Dear Ortho,
Anything irrational with the above?
I humbly claim that all of the above is rationality pure and simple. Yet it makes a case for ethics, happiness, and the true concept of God. How's that for a philosophy?
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| נשלח ב-25/12/2005 02:14 |
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Ani,
I can say that you have a fine philosophy, at least, that is, about the parts I could understand. The problem, though, is that I don't see how your philosophy determines any value in an action except insofar as it satisfies your own desires.
How is this different from meaningless and subjective hedonism?
Can you tell me why Hitler was bad?
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| נשלח ב-25/12/2005 09:17 |
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Dear Orto,
Hitler may not of had been bad in the sense of free choice, but "bad" is a fact independent of the bad's object's intentions and capacities. A rotten apple is bad even if one blames God or we don't find anybody to blame for it.
I opened recently a cluster about the relationship between values and desires in which the point you raised is debated.
Please have a look:
http://hydepark.hevre.co.il/hydepark/topic.asp?topic_id=1718717
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| נשלח ב-26/12/2005 01:04 |
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Dear Ortho,
You write,
''I read your response. I can say that you have a fine philosophy, at least, that is, about the parts I could understand. The problem, though, is that I don't see how your philosophy determines any value in an action except insofar as it satisfies your own desires.''
I'm not sure what you're questioning, do you see how my philosophy requires one to perfectly ethical, and your question is that this ethics is because I 'desire' it so? And you somehow feel that once I desire it, it loses it's purity and it's altruism? Is that your question
''How is this different from meaningless and subjective hedonism?''
I should really wait on you clarifying your first point, but let me just throw in a small point for this second question of yours.
The only reason one feels 'bad' about selfish hedonism is because deep down it doesn't make sense to him, he feels uncomfortable about it, it's the 'voice' of rationality (as explained above) that bugs him. It doesn't sound right to him.
But if it's not 'selfish' hedonism, if it's pursuit of happiness and pleasure for the whole universe then the whole uneasiness is gone. Think of the icon of selfless altruism of our generation, Mother Teresa, she dedicated her whole life to what…. to make sure that the whole world will have happiness and pleasure. Yet you wouldn't feel that it has the same problem of hedonism.
''Can you tell me why Hitler was bad?''
What exactly do you mean with the word 'bad'?
Wrong? Was he wrong?
Yes! His action was irrational i.e. was as wrong as saying that 2+2 is 5.
Is it right to kill him? Yes!
Just as right as helping myself to a glass of water when I'm thirsty where my (picture of) reality expects me to give myself the glass of water. It's what I see the future facts as happening (obviously so, for the only way that it could be that I'm doing this act is if it entered my mind) and as long as there is no impediment from another aspect of reality that is precisely what will happen.
Remember, we shouldn't look at ethics and rational actions as some kind of ephemeral transcending experience. It simply is about going with the flow, or more precisely, not contradicting oneself. The only wrongness is when I'm contradicting myself, which is the same as saying that I'm not in harmony with reality, for contradicting means that another aspect of reality shows me that this one angle is not the whole picture, hence it's not true to treat it as such, it's factually wrong.
I do agree that this issue needs to be explained better but as a rule of thumb I'd say that once I'm not contradicting myself I'm right, If I'm not contradicting myself, i.e. I'm not being wrong, then I'm right.
So Hitler was wrong, and I am right when going to kill him, it is the right thing to do.
Although I subscribe to determinism and Hitler was a product of his circumstance I still would kill him as I would shut of a nuclear reactor about to explode.
Does the word bad connote something other than 'it' being wrong and that the right thing to do is to annihilate 'it'?
תוקן על ידי - עני_בפתח - 26/12/2005 1:06:28
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| נשלח ב-26/12/2005 13:20 |
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Dear Ani,
It is a pleasure (value  ) to read you. As to your rhetorical question about the meaning of bad, when it pertains to a living being, it is unfortunately interpreted as an intention to act badly although there was a possibility to act in a good way. That speculative possibility is of course meaningless and even not illusionary to determinists like you and me.
However, the habit to attribute such badness of having had an equal opportunity and having chosen the bad for its bad sake, is so powerful and ingrained since childhood, that it causes a lot of unnecessary hate in our world. Not that I deny that part of justice requires hate too towards hitlers and the like, it is only that such hate and justice should be carried out with sorrow and pity and not with arabic "yemach-shemo" kind of lynching.
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| נשלח ב-26/12/2005 15:36 |
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Ani and Sachliel,
My question is in regard to the very point of morality. As far as I can tell you have two choices in how to ground a theory of morality. You can be moral for its own sake where there is a deontological prescribed way to act regardless of the specific circumstances or you can be a consequentialist where you act in such a way that it fulfills whatever goal or goals you had in mind to fulfill.
Do you act because it is right? Or do you act in order to achieve a goal?
It seems to me that you act morally just because you have certain goals in mind. To satisfy a rational view of the world, to make the most people happy, whatever. But this morality is limited to just what _you_ desire and whoever else you can convince to also desire. What if someone desires something else?
What if Hitler doesn't desire a rational worldview? So what if he's wrong in a mathematical operation? Is it immoral to do anything irrational? (I, for one, wouldn't kill anyone because he thinks 2+2=5, would you?)
He may be outside _your_ desires of what the universe "ought" to be, but how can you universalize your desires? Perhaps many humans think like you do (or could potentially think as you do), but clearly there are some who do not.
I respect your philosophy in that it creates a good and relatively high-minded justification for moral action for the individual, but it fails as a universal moral ethic.
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| נשלח ב-26/12/2005 16:29 |
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Ortho,
I'll respond to your points later a bit, but if possible let us please also discuss the main thrust of your article in your blog which I have reposted here. You write that due to the technological advances happening every day we have no way of conceptualizing an enduring philosophy. Please read my first comment to see where I question your premise.
Actually your argument has some merit even without the issue of technological advances. The simple fact that most of the philosophies that are current today have been around thousands of years in some shape or form so that the question begs itself, what makes us think that we will fend off all arguments that have been made against any philosophy we fancy. There surely have been arguments against it otherwise there would have been worldwide acceptance of it.
In somewhat the same vein I just bumped in an essay written 2,000 years ago, goes by the name Lucian, He's out to prove the absurdity of philosophising due to so many different opinions, most of them allegedly from smart people so that we would have to learn all of their philosophies and then try to decide between them.
The obvious problems he has with that recepie is that he only has one lifetime to live and the above will take more in the range of 20 lifetimes, also that he has to make sure to find the right teachers for all the philosophies, for if he finds someone who misrepresents the philosophy then in the end he hasn't learned that particular philosophy.
Also, who's to say that after all this learning you will be the wise enough judge to decide which philosphy is the TRUE one.
He goes on and on in typical old school philosophy where he takes his time to bring out every minute little argument. (I'm suspecting an ulterior motive on his part, he simply wanted to add to the literatures of philosophy so that his first argument should be all the more powerful )
What do the Chachmey Haforum say about this dilemma?
תוקן על ידי - עני_בפתח - 26/12/2005 16:31:50
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| נשלח ב-26/12/2005 21:36 |
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A giten Chanike to Ani, Orto and Sachli,
Concerning your remark, Ani, I will paraphrase what has been said about Rav Kreiswirth z"l of Antwerp who learned in Lublin by Reb Mayer Shapiro and later on went to learn in Eretz Yisrooel by the Chazon Ish. From his time in Lublin, RK was a tremendous booki who would quote Yerushalmis and anything the like, word by word of by heart. So when he came to learn by the CI, it was said of him that now he is becoming a lamden on the whole shas all at once.
We both, Ani and I, know someone who is also a tremendous booki with a huge library who since he was exposed to the theory of Hove-Oneness-Compatibility, constantly reduces the size of his library.
The process of increasing the way of our thinking from principles, rather than being focused on their details, is like climbing a mountain. The wider the horizon, the clearer, more concentrated and more encompassing is the view. Thus, the necessity for knowledge tools (that is verbality) is extremely reduced.
The story of the Aitz Hadaas points to the focus with the nose on details being the cardinal sin of man and that the withdrawn global view on all the trees is his ideal and his salvation.
For better elaboration I will quote myself from a recent cluster in the hebrew forum,
http://hydepark.hevre.co.il/hydepark/topic.asp?topic_id=1717615
Ortho,
I reccomend as Sachliel did above to have a look at his cluster about values and pleasure.
תוקן על ידי - עצור_כאן - 26/12/2005 21:44:20
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| נשלח ב-27/12/2005 07:08 |
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Ortho,
You write,
My question is in regard to the very point of morality. As far as I can tell you have two choices in how to ground a theory of morality. You can be moral for its own sake where there is a deontological prescribed way to act regardless of the specific circumstances or you can be a consequentialist where you act in such a way that it fulfills whatever goal or goals you had in mind to fulfill.
Do you act because it is right? Or do you act in order to achieve a goal?
It seems to me that you act morally just because you have certain goals in mind. To satisfy a rational view of the world, to make the most people happy, whatever. But this morality is limited to just what _you_ desire and whoever else you can convince to also desire. What if someone desires something else?
Going with the flow is NOT intended for achieving certain goals. I do it because this is the rational non-contradictory right thing to do (as option 1 that you gave). Going with the flow essentially means that whatever enters my mind I do, as long as there is no contradictory awareness in my mind. It's not mindless hedonism that you're uncomfortable with [rightly so] because my mind definitely sees acts of helping everyone (any potential I imagine, be it on myself or others, would be part of my actions if I just totally go with the flow, i.e. I do whatever enters my mind, as long as there is no other 'entry' that neutralizes the first one) and it doesn't really see any reason to differentiate between myself and others.
Please realize that to a certain extent I always go with the flow, the only distinction between a person going with the flow and a person that we say 'doesn't go with the flow' is that person B when doing something will only take a part of his 'mind data' (whatever entered his mind) and will go with 'that' flow. So that there still remains a part of his mind that contraindicates that specific action so that essentially he's not in flow with the whole of his being, or with the whole of his reality. He's not in harmony with ALL.
Whereas the person we say is in the flow, we mean that he has taken ALL his data entries into account and just follows that. He really goes with the flow; he doesn't arbitrarily disregard certain mind entries, entries that are factually there so much so that they will nag him to act based on them, he'll be conflicted, an inner voice that telling him he's not right. No! he doesn't have this conflict as he takes everything in account. Yet in the end all he does is just whatever comes to mind.
If I have a nice painting here but it's missing red color and I have a bucket of red paint that fits in perfectly so if I am for whatever reason focusing on this painting (to the exclusion of a lot of other phenomena) my mind will strongly see this paint belonging to be painted on this canvas. Yet if the only red coloring I have is that I can kill this man here and use his blood I wouldn't do it because my mind sees how this blood belongs to be in this body. The 'belonging' of this mans blood in his body is the same type of belonging of the red paint to the canvas, it's just that the awareness of 'blood goes in this body' is much stronger than the awareness of 'red paint goes with this canvas' so the blood ends up in the body and I don't kill him to put it on the painting.
The only criteria is how a thing 'belongs' in my mind, how it belongs according to my reality, how reality tells me to place it, how Existence guides me.
What if Hitler doesn't desire a rational worldview? So what if he's wrong in a mathematical operation? Is it immoral to do anything irrational? (I, for one, wouldn't kill anyone because he thinks 2+2=5, would you?)
If according to rational thinking the right thing to do is to shut off this nuclear reactor, or to pour myself a cup of water, or to kill Mr. Hitler, that is what I'll do, no emotions need be attached. I'm not killing him because of certain opinions he has (that 2+2 is 5 or whatever) I don't blame him for anything. It's just a rational act.
He may be outside _your_ desires of what the universe "ought" to be, but how can you universalize your desires? Perhaps many humans think like you do (or could potentially think as you do), but clearly there are some who do not.
I respect your philosophy in that it creates a good and relatively high-minded justification for moral action for the individual, but it fails as a universal moral ethic.
I don't understand how rational facts are not universal. 2+2=5 is universal.
Also, I abide by my own reality, I am not forcing anything on anybody, I'm not even forcing anything on myself, my only criteria is doing what comes to mind and (now listen to this) if according to my reality it belongs to take a glass of water or to kill Hitler I'll do it. No qualms whatsoever. Although nobody is at fault. (I'm saying this in strong language but in reality this philosophy is merciful and just. Please understand that when trying to define and justify 'justice' we have to prove it without using emotional feelings of ''justice''.)
My only guide is not to contradict myself, and this is something that no one can afford to do, it's virtually impossible that this here is A but it's not A.
As long as we are all objective it is universal, and insofar as my limitations on being objective, I obviously am not aware of it (once I'm aware that my point of view is not the only angle to see a certain phenomena, I already am forced to encompass that angle too so that I'm again objective. It's only what I totally don't even fathom is where I'm missing objectivity and that on that I'm completely helpless.
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