Deciding correctly - a draft of my paper

The experience of total lack of justified endeavors

הבל הבלים הכל הבל. מה יתרון לאדם בכל עמלו שיעמל תחת השמש?[1]

Qohelet describes an experience in which reflection, and recognition of the contingent and fleeting nature of what seems valuable, lead the person to feel lost in an ocean of meaninglessness.  I find a friend in Qohelet ever since I have experienced something similar. Reflecting on my activities, it seemed that I had gotten used to playing certain life-games[2], influenced by my society and age group. Those life-games determined what is important and what is unimportant, what is desirable and what is not, what I should and shouldn't do. Noticing that people in different age groups and different social groups play different life-games, I could see that the particular life-games that I had been taking seriously were not the only way to live. Many people seemed to uncritically follow ways of life that their social circles expect them to follow, keeping up with the changing life-games of their age group. I could imagine living like that myself, but the thought disturbed me; partly because it implied that at some point in the future I would probably not consider important those things that felt so important at the time (due to the expected change in life-games). Such thoughts have shaken my attachment to my life-games. I found myself ''outside of them'' during some reflective moments, in which I was trying to decide which life-game to pursue. I couldn't help seeking to make this decision correctly, rather than arbitrarily. The problem was that outside of these games, it seemed like I lost all standards for correctness of decision.

   Just doing what I am used to, or conforming to what other people in my society are accustomed to, without further justification, seemed arbitrary. It seemed like a decision without a justification, without any reason to think that it is more correct than any other decision. Nor could I think of a new goal that it seemed justified to pursue. Every goal I could think of seemed to lack justification, to the point where pursuing it or its opposite would both be just as arbitrary.

   What I experienced can be described as total lack of justified endeavors. [3] I shall try to explain the connection of this experience to the nature of practical reasoning as I see it. In order to do so I have to introduce a conceptual framework for my analysis of practical reasoning, or deliberation.

   Deliberation is mainly an attempt to rationally decide what would be the correct way to act.[4] Successful deliberation includes reaching a justified decision regarding the correct way to act. Justification of a decision is an account that shows that this decision is correct in some sense. 

    Goals[5] can serve as an adopted normative standard, according to which one evaluates possible decisions and actions. (A normative standard says what ought to be, what is valuable, desirable, etc.; Not only what is.) When in some circumstance a particular action is the best mean for a given end, choosing it would be correct, in a sense, relative to this particular end (as the sole normative standard).[6] Thus, an action can be justified by showing that it is the best mean for a particular end. But in such situations, usually we face another open choice[7] – whether to adopt or reject this end.  If so, justification is needed for also the decision to adopt (or to not-reject) this end.    Note that by "rejection" here I mean making decisions that are intentionally contrary to (or not in accordance with) the relevant standard.

   This line of thought can be formulated as a logical law of practical justifications: if action X is justified according to adopted standard S, but the adoption of standard S is based on decision Y which isn't justified, then action X is not really justified.   But what could justify decision Y to adopt standard S?  Certainly not standard S itself.[8] There might be some other standard S2 which would justify decision Y, but often this justification would depend on the justification of decision Y2 to adopt (or not reject) S2, so the problem reoccurs. An infinite regression of justifications doesn't seem to justify any action or decision.    It seems that the only way to avoid it, is by ending the chain of practical justifications[9] with some adopted normative standard such that no further justification is required for adopting it.[10]

   I can't rest at this deion of a final normative standard, because it seems too vague. I shall introduce a formulation that seems more substantial. It might seem strange, but I hope that it will become more appealing gradually as the paper is read. I find that I can think of only too two possible deions of standards such that no further justification is required for adopting:

1. A standard that it is evidently correct to adopt – or if it is already adopted, evidently incorrect to reject.
2. A standard that it is impossible (in some sense) to reject merely by deciding so.

I will group those two deions under one predicate which I shall term ­irrejectable-d, (stands for irrejectable deliberatively) as follows:[11]

An ­irrejectable-d standard is a standard such that it is either evidently incorrect or impossible (merely by deciding so) to reject.

I shall call any standard that doesn't satisfy this condition rejectable-d.

    The closure "merely by deciding so" above is meant to allow the possibility of taking indirect measures to affect one's self as to bring a rejection of the relevant standard in the future. Such indirect measures may employ drugs, hypnosis, psychological treatment, meditation, etc. Despite having the ability to employ such measures in order to reject a standard, one might not be able to stop evaluating according to this standard at the present (which may mean that it would be irrational for the person to choose to employ such measures).

This terminology helps to summarize my main points.

   My analysis leads to the following conclusion: it is a necessary condition for the possibility of practical justifications, that the agent adopts an irrejectable-d standard according to which some actions or decisions are correct.    If irrejectable-d standards are impossible, and I have said nothing to deny this possibility, then ultimately no action or decision can be justified. One could still talk about justified actions, relying on a social convention regarding the standard for correctness. But such correctness and justification would be only conventional. Personally, as long as I regard a convention as rejectable-d I can't rationally accept it as a final justification for my own activity. 

   I have experienced total lack of justified endeavors because I couldn't identify any irrejectable-d goal. (By this term I mean a goal that is included in an irrejectable-d standard or that under some circumstances pursuing it would be correct according to an irrejectable-d standard.)   I often relive some of this experience, in varying degrees of depth. I step back from the life-games that I have gotten used to, ask myself what my justification for ''playing'' them is, only to discover that I have been unjustifiably treating some goal(s) as irrejectable-d. Fortunately, this deliberative reflection doesn't bring me to total lack of justified endeavors, ever since I found a justified endeavor to pursue. I discuss this breakthrough elsewhere.[12]     

   In this paper, my purpose in bringing up the experience of total lack of justified endeavors is to arrive at some conclusions about the nature of deliberation and human motivation. Our theories in these areas should allow for the experience of total lack of justified endeavors rather than absolve it as a senseless philosophical artifact, or a rationalization of emotional mechanisms.   (My account so far can be seen as a phenomenological analysis, a conceptual analysis, or a very limited psychological theory. I don't think that those three realms can be totally separated. Even phenomenology in the introspective sense, without any pretense of arriving at universal conclusions about consciousness or human nature, cannot be isolated from social discourse or from psychology. Language is first and foremost social. My phenomenological deions are influenced by certain conceptual frameworks. Different psychological theories, in particular, could influence me to describe my phenomenological experience differently, to make different generalizations of my momentary experiences. When I am choosing to describe my experience in a certain way, I am actually making decisions in psychology. I am offering my conceptual framework as a contribution to the social discourse, in particular to theories regarding human nature. )[13]

Irreducibility of the terminology

Here I would like to address a somewhat "technical" conceptual issue.  One could attack the meaning, or possible explanatory value, of my formulations, as follows: there is no meaning to correctness of action or decision, which is not dependent on a particular normative standard. Normally, whenever we say that one is trying to act correctly, we actually mean ''trying to act according to S'', S being a particular normative standard that the person has in mind.  If we want to talk about some correctness that is not relative to a particular normative standard that the person has in mind, we should state the standard for correctness that we refer to. Otherwise, it is not clear what we mean by saying that the person is trying to act correctly. It seems that we cannot explain any particular behavior by assuming that the person has a motivation to act correctly, unless we specify what the standard for correctness is.

   I think that while there is some truth to the assumptions in this argument, it is misleading. It might be true that in order to explain particular behavior with a motivation to decide correctly, we have to define the standard for correctness. But in some cases, such as the experience of total lack of justified endeavors, it is enough to refer to the person's irrejectable-d standards, whether they are known to us or not, whether they are known to the person or not, and whether they exist or not. An idea of an entity can motivate a person even if the entity doesn't exist. We don't have to know whether God exists in order to describe one's behavior as ''preying to God'', nor whether enlightenment is possible in order to explain the goal of some spiritual seeker practicing some sort of meditation. Irrejectable-d standards may not exist, in which case seeking correctness of decision beyond all of one's known adopted normative standards is doomed to failure; but that doesn't mean that a person cannot be occupied with such a search.

   It might seem that in my conceptual framework, (a) ''Sharon's motivation to decide correctly'' is in a sense equivalent to (b) ''Sharon's motivation to decide according to her irrejectable-d standards''. The concept of correctness is hidden here in the term ''according to'', or visa versa. However, in some context (a) and (b) are equivalent de-re, but different de-dicto: Sharon might think that she wants to decide correctly but not that she wants to act according to her rejectable-d standards. So we have to be careful with such reductions. Even more dangerous, is to equate the locution ''One's irrejectable-d standards'' with ''the standards that the person has in mind''. Sharon doesn't necessarily know what her irrejectable-d standards are (whether it is impossible or evidently incorrect to reject them), and therefore doesn't necessarily ''have them in mind''. Even if Sharon thinks that she knows what her irrejectable-d standards are, she might be wrong about them. Similarly, even if we don't know what Sharon's irrejectable-d standards are, we can still talk meaningfully about her irrejectable-d standards, about her motivation to make decisions according to them, or in short – her motivation to decide correctly.    These conceptual distinctions are particularly necessary for describing the experience of total lack of justified endeavors, because it is based on not-knowing the normative standard according to which it would be correct to act.[14] {I believe that they would also be necessary for an account of some cases of change in normative beliefs, such as moral or religious views. My conceptual framework would allow that such changes can be a result of deliberation.[15]}

Irrejectable-d goals

The main line of thought that I wanted to present so far can be summarized as follows: during deliberation there is no escape from aiming at correct decisions; correctness requires standards; and it seems that infinite regression can only be avoided with irrejectable-d standards.  I'd like to focus now on this last concept, attempting to make it more digestible despite its strange name…

   I often realize that I have been treating some goal as irrejectable-d, without having made a conscious decision to do so. For me, as I remarked before, this moment of reflection often comes with the realization that the particular goal is in fact rejectable-d and that it lacks justification. I suspect that some people stop their search for correct decisions at certain points uncritically; they stop the reflective process at some normative standards (goals, values, principles) that serve as final practical justifications in their decision process. This is why they don't experience total lack of justified endeavors. Other people may be able to question each of their normative standards during some reflective moods, but do not care for the justification of adopting (some of) them. I would call such reflection theoretical rather than deliberative (part of deliberation), i.e. not performed in order to make correct choices. But restricting deliberative reflection doesn't have to be the only way to avoid total lack of justified endeavors. There are also people who question a normative standard that serves as a final practical justification for them, in a moment of deliberative reflection, and find their adoption of it justified, or not in need of justification. What would they answer if asked ''why do you adopt this standard?''   I think many would say that it is obviously correct to do so, or that it feels that way, implying that they can't change it (merely by deciding so) as much as they can't change other feelings. {I shall discuss the relation of emotions to normativity later.} They might even say straight forward that the standard is inherent in them, not open to choice. In other words, I suggest seeing their view as in agreement with the claim that it is either evidently incorrect or impossible for them (merely by deciding so) to make decisions that are intentionally contrary to the normative standard that they treat as the final justification for their endeavor.[16] This is the definition of an irrejectable-d standard. So they can be said to believe (whether correctly or not) to have recognized a standard as irrejectable-d, in these words or others.

   The last group includes people that see (some) irrejectable-d normative standards as known objective truths – in particular, philosophers that subscribe to meta-ethical or meta-normative (a wider realm that includes normativity beyond the classical ethical issues) non-skeptical objectivism.[17] Davidson {ref} argues convincingly that moral discourse assumes meta-ethical objectivism. My interest here is more about life-philosophy than analysis of social discourse, though the two are related. From the perspective of practical reasoning, the concept of irrejectable-d and the concept of objective truth are similar in that when a person discovers an objective truth, like empirical or logical truths, it is evidently incorrect for him to practically reject it – i.e., in full awareness of its objective truth, intentionally decide to act according to its negation. If we think that a person recognizes a truth but acts according to its negation, we easily conclude that he was subject to some irrationality, such as self deception or wishful thinking. {One might even argue that it is impossible to accomplish this intentionally during a mental mode of faultless deliberation, but I don't wish to substantiate this claim at this point.} So truths are something like irrejectable-d by their knower,[18] and this suggests that some irrejectable-d normative standards may be known truths. {For now? or- for the purposes of this paper} I shall leave the possibility of knowing objective normative truths as an open question.[19] But if possible, they could serve as irrejectable-d normative standards.

   Another possible type of irrejectable-d standards is what stems from the nature of the deliberative mechanism itself. If there are essential features of proper deliberation, without which one cannot be said to deliberate faultlessly (i.e. with no irrationality), then these features might be translatable to irrejectable-d standards. I think that consistency is a good candidate for such an essential feature of deliberation (though it seems like no goal to pursue can be derived solely from this standard). Perhaps all logical truths should be classified in this category (- a claim which may or may not be compatible with the claim that they are objective normative truths). Making a decision that is intentionally inconsistent, or illogical, seems evidently incorrect. {And here too, it can be argued that it is impossible to accomplish this intentionally during a mental mode of faultless deliberation.}

   A third type of deliberatively irrejectable normative standards could be emotional constraints. David Hume, for instance, would have considered (at least some) emotional constraints as deliberative irrejectable. {This will be discussed further below}.

   Related to the classification of irrejectable-d standards to the types I mentioned, is the question of their possible relativity: can they be universal, can they be relative to a person, and can they be relative to a particular time or human activity? I would like to leave all options open at this point.[20]

   There are some candidates for irrejectable-d standards that it is not clear to which type they belong, such as prudence, pursuing self-interest, and pursuing happiness. Usually they are not presented as objective normative truths. They could be presented as emotional constraints, perhaps universal or almost universal (in all ''normal'' or ''healthy'' human beings). Alternatively they might be considered part of the deliberative mechanism itself.    Any candidate for irrejectable-d standard that I can think of, can be classified under the types that I have mentioned.  

The threat from Humean psychologistic reductions

   Some would argue that the only possible type of irrejectable-d normative standard from which a goal can be derived, is an emotional constraint. This line of thought may lead to a reductive psychologistic analysis of my experience of total lack of justified endeavors, based on a Humean picture of motivation: talking about correctness of decisions and irrejectable-d standards that go beyond the claims of the passions, is only good for a phenomenology of a rationalization, not a theory of practical reasoning or motivation.  In other words, for some psychological reason I was denying my irrejectable-d emotional constraints, using the search for correctness of decisions as an excuse, a rationalization for my behavior.

   I don't see my experience that way, but frankly I can't rule out the possibility that this interpretation is true and that I might realize this in the future, understanding myself better.

   What is more relevant to the subject of this paper, is the question whether some human being can experience total lack of justified endeavors without denial of passions (rather than whether my I experienced it without denial personally). Though I do not wholly agree with the Humean model of human motivation, {in the next section} I would like to discuss it and show that it doesn't force the reductive analysis; that even under a (reasonable version of a) Humean picture there's still room for a sincere search for correct decisions that questions the correctness of acting according to the passions. This discussion will also pave the way for a non-Humean view regarding the role of deliberation in human motivation, which I shall present in a later section. {There I shall argue against considering emotional constraints as irrejectable-d normative standards.}