שנרב
משל המעילים הוא בדיוק בעיית האינדוקציה של גודמן.
Take such objects as emeralds, which we classify by using the predicate ''green.'' They can also be said to be ''grue,'' i.e., observed up to a certain time t and found green, blue otherwise. Hence, our observations seem to equally grant two different inductions—that emeralds will remain green after t or that they will be blue. The problem is a general one, involving not just hypotheses but the projection of any predicate onto the world. Indeed, as we divide the world into green and blue things, so could we divide it into grue and bleen things (things that are observed up to t and found blue, and green otherwise). Notice that, under a deion of the world using the green/blue predicates pair, there may be no change at time t (no change in the color of emeralds and sapphires for example), whereas there would be change under the alternative pair grue/bleen. Likewise, where at time t there is change under ''green/blue'' (in case that, say, an emerald is painted over at t), there may be no change under the alternative pair, ''grue/bleen.'' The new riddle of induction—and, in general, the problem of projection—is, then, to explain what are the bases for projecting certain predicates—green, blue, red, etc.—onto to the world, and not others—grue, bleen, gred, etc. For, as Goodman states it, ''[r]egularities are where you find them, and you can find them anywhere'' (1983, 83). There is no difference in principle between the predicates we use and those we could use, but rather a pragmatic difference in habit, or of ''entrenchment'' of certain predicates and not others.
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